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SYMBOLISM AND INCOMMENSURABILITY
IN CIVIL SANCTIONING: DECISION MAKERS
AS GOAL MANAGERS*
Jennifer K Robbennolt, John M. Darley & Robert J. MacCoun'
INTRODUCTION
Factfinders in civil cases must often make a
constellation of decisions, such as assigning responsibility and
blame, making compensation and (sometimes) giving out
punishment. These decisions are likely to evoke numerous
social and moral concerns and, therefore, inevitably implicate a
variety of instrumental and symbolic goals. We argue that
descriptions of legal decision making that fail to consider the
psychological interplay among these different goals are likely
to come up short in their efforts to explicate the ways in which
jurors and other factfinders make decisions in civil cases.
Instead, we suggest that decision making in civil cases can
profitably be thought of as a process by which decision makers
attempt to maximally satisfy a wide variety of goals in parallel.
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In contrast to many traditional legal and economic
portrayals of legal decision making which posit that decision
makers can pursue single motives as instructed, Part I argues
that jurors and other finders-of-fact deciding civil cases ought
to be thought of as pursuing many different goals
simultaneously. This Part briefly describes many of the goals
that may underlie decision making in civil cases and introduces
a set of basic goal management principles that define how
these goals interrelate. Part II describes social psychological
research that suggests that legal decision makers may be
motivated to pursue a variety of goals in addition to the
traditional goals of determining fault, compensating plaintiffs
and deterring defendants. Different motives for distributing
resources, value expressive goals and a need to restore the
proper relative moral balance between the parties may all play
a role in civil decision making. In Part III, we propose that
decision makers may attempt simultaneously to satisfy these
multiple goals through a process of parallel constraint
satisfaction.
I. DECISION MAKER GOALS
A. Traditional Legal and Economic Models of Decision
Making
Traditional descriptions of legal decision making
presume, at least implicitly, that jurors and other legal
factfinders are driven by a single motive at any given time and
are able to focus on one purpose to the exclusion of others in
making a given decision. Further, these descriptions assume
that the single purpose on which decision makers will focus is
the one that the legal system finds appropriate for making the
judgment in question. Since the legal system regards different
purposes as appropriate for the different decisions it asks
decision makers to make about a single case, it assumes that
the decision makers will rotate into place the decision rule that
the justice system instructs them to use. The system assumes
further that decision makers will apply that (and only that)
decision rule for the decision in question. This view of system
conforming, single rule governed factfinders underlies
numerous legal rules that assume decision makers can
compartmentalize information and make independent
judgments. For example, decision makers are asked to isolate
their reactions to extra-evidentiary information, such as
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pretrial publicity or inadmissible evidence,, from their
evaluation of the trial evidence. Similarly, decision makers are
expected to use certain evidence for some purposes, but not for
others. For example, decision makers may use prior record
testimony to impeach a defendant's credibility as a witness but
not to determine his or her culpability.2 Decision makers are
also often asked to reach independent verdicts on multiple
claims, for multiple plaintiffs or against multiple defendants in
a single trial.3
Sometimes it is not the trial evidence that requires
compartmentalization, but the rules or motives for the decision
or set of decisions made. For instance, in civil trials decision
,makers are expected to compartmentalize their decisions so
,that liability, compensation and punitive damages judgments
are each made independently. Decision makers are presumed
ito pursue different goals through each decision. Specifically,
decision makers are expected to be driven by a motive of causal
accuracy in making liability determinations, by the plaintiff-
focused motive of compensation in making compensatory
damages determinations and by the defendant-focused motives
of retribution and deterrence in making punitive damages
determinations.4 In fact, it becomes more complicated. Given
the different decision motives, decision makers are asked to use
each decision to achieve separate objectives and may, therefore,
be asked to consider certain evidence as relevant to only some
1 See generally Christina A. Studebaker & Steven D. Penrod, Pretrial
Publicity: The Media, the Law, and Common Sense, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 428
(1997); Shari Seidman Diamond & Neil Vidmar, Jury Room Ruminations on Forbidden
Topics, 87 VA. L. REV. 1857, 1860 (2001) ("In both instances [pretrial publicity and
legally irrelevant evidence], jurors are instructed to set aside (to erase) information
that is already available to them and to reach their verdicts based simply on the legally
permissible evidence which has been presented at trial. While courts recognize that
jurors cannot be expected to proceed in this fashion on some occasions, granting a
change of venue or a mistrial as a remedy, the reliance on simple admonitions to
disregard inadmissible information reflects a perception of the jury as a blank slate on
which trial testimony can be written and erased.").
2 See FED. R. EVID. 404(b), 609.
3 See FED. R. CIv. P. 13 (counterclaims and cross-claims); 14 (third-party
practice); 18 (joinder of claims and remedies); 19 (joinder of persons needed for just
adjudication); 20 (permissive joinder of parties); 21 (misjoinder and non-joinder of
parties); 22 (interpleader); 23 (class actions); & 24 (intervention).
4 With regard to punitive damages, the goal of deterrence has been the
primary focus of many legal analysts. See, e.g., David Crump, Evidence, Economics,
and Ethics: What Information Should Jurors be Given to Determine the Amount of a
Punitive-Damage Award?, 57 MD. L. REV. 174 (1998); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven
Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869 (1998). But
see Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal
Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1393 (1993).
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of these decisions but not to others. For example, defendant
wealth is often appropriately considered as a factor in punitive
damages decisions, but should not affect decisions about
liability or compensatory damages.5 Similarly, decision makers
may be asked to postpone certain judgments until others have
been reached, and to prevent possible conclusions of the
postponed judgments from influencing prior decisions. In civil
trials, for instance, jurors' views regarding damages are not to
influence their evaluation of defendant liability.6
In a similar way, economic models of legal decision
making also tend to presume that legal decision makers pursue
unitary objectives. A clear example of this is the optimal
deterrence model, where the primary purpose of a civil verdict,
including any punitive damages award, is to set damages at
the level that will result in the most efficient deterrence of
harmful behavior.7 According to optimal deterrence theory, the
5 See Jennifer H. Arlen, Should Defendants' Wealth Matter?, 21 J. LEGAL
STUD. 413 (1992); Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of
Penalties, 87 GEO. L.J. 421 (1998); Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, "Crimtorts" as
Corporate Just Deserts, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 289, 315 (1998); Michael Rustad, In
Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing Tort Anecdotes with
Empirical Data, 78 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1992). See also Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip,
499 U.S. 1, 6 n.1 (1991); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 464 n.29
(1993); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979). Some state statues specifically
note wealth as a factor: ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020(c) (2002); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3295(d)
(West 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3702(b)(6) (1994); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD.
PROC. § 10-913 (2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20(3) (West 2000); MISS. CODE ANN. §
11-1-65(1)(e) (1999); MO. ANN. STAT. § 510.263(2) (West 2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-
1-221(7)(a) (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.12 (2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-35 (2000);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2314.21 (Anderson 2001); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9.1 (West
2001); 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1301.812-A(a) (West 2001); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 41.011 (2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(2) (2000). But see Kenneth S.
Abraham & John C. Jeffries, Jr., Punitive Damages and the Rule of Law: The Role of
Defendant's Wealth, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 415 (1989); Crump, supra note 4; Polinsky &
Shavell, supra note 4. A few states prohibit the use of financial status information. See,
e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102(6) (1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-11(3) (2001).
For empirical studies examining the effects of wealth on decision making in civil cases
see VALERIE HANS, BUSINESS ON TRIAL: THE CIVIL JURY AND CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY 112-37 (2000); Valerie P. Hans & M. David Ermann, Responses to
Corporate Versus Individual Wrongdoing, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 151, 157 (1989);
Robert J. MacCoun, Differential Treatment of Corporate Defendants by Juries: An
Examination of the "Deep-Pockets" Hypothesis, 30 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 121 (1996);
Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Punitive Damages Decision Making: The Decisions of Citizens
and Trial Court Judges, 26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 315 (2002); NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY: CONFRONTING THE MYTHS ABOUT JURY
INCOMPETENCE, DEEP POCKETS, AND OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE AWARDS 203-20 (1995).
6 Similarly, in criminal trials, jurors' views regarding sentence severity
should not influence their evaluation of defendant guilt.
7 Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 4; W. Kip Viscusi, The Challenge of
Punitive Damages Mathematics, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 313, 331 (2001). The notion of
"optimal" deterrence "implies deterring offensive conduct only up to the point at which
1124 [Vol. 68: 4
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purpose of punitive damages is to offset any deficit in the
ability of compensatory damages to deter harmful behavior
caused by any ability the defendant has to escape detection or
liability.8 In accordance with this theory, the likelihood that the
harmful conduct will be detected ought to be related to the
appropriate degree of punishment.9 Under this model, decision
makers are expected to render punitive damages decisions that
vary inversely with the likelihood of detection; their decisions
are considered to be erroneous if they do not.'1 Even when these
traditional legal and economic models are viewed as purely
normative or prescriptive-rather than descriptive of actual
decision making-their use as a baseline or benchmark for
evaluating jury performance implicitly adopts the models'
narrow goal conceptualization.
Much empirical research into legal decision making,
however, demonstrates that decision makers have difficulty
with the tasks these models require; the models assume that
decision makers can select and exclusively use a single, legally
appropriate decision rule. Decision makers have trouble, for
example, ignoring pretrial publicity" or inadmissible
evidence; 2 using specified evidence for some purposes but not
society begins to lose more from deterrence efforts than from the offenses it deters" in
contrast to "complete" deterrence in which the goal is to "stop offenders from
committing offensive acts." Hylton, supra note 5, at 421.
8 Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 4, at 873-74.
It follows from these observations that a crucial question for consideration is
whether injurers sometimes escape liability for harms for which they are
responsible. If they do, the level of liability imposed on them when they are
found liable needs to exceed compensatory damages so that, on average, they
will pay for the harm that they cause. This excess liability can be labeled
"punitive damages," and failure to impose it would result in inadequate
deterrence. In summary, punitive damages ordinarily should be awarded if,
and only if an injurer has a chance of escaping liability for the harm he
causes.
Id.
9 Id. at 889-90.
10 See generally Polinksy & Shavell, supra note 4; Viscusi, supra note 7.
" See Studebaker & Penrod, supra note 1 (review); Brian H. Bornstein et al.,
Pretrial Publicity and Civil Cases: A Two Way Street?, 26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3 (2002)
(examining the effects of pretrial publicity in civil cases); Nancy Mehrkens Steblay et
al., The Effects of Pretrial Publicity on Juror Verdicts: A Meta-Analytic Review, 23 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 219 (1999) (meta-analysis). See generally Special Issue, Empirical and
Legal Perspectives on the Impact of Pretrial Publicity, 26 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 1 (2002).
See also Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Christina A. Studebaker, News Media Reporting on
Civil Litigation and Its Influence on Civil Justice Decision Making, 27 LAw & HUM.
BEHAV. 5 (2003) (reviewing empirical research on pretrial publicity effects in civil
cases).
,2 See Stephan Landsman & Richard F. Rakos, A Preliminary Inquiry into
the Effects of Potentially Biasing Information on Judges and Jurors in Civil Litigation,
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for others; 3 reaching independent verdicts on multiple claims,
for multiple plaintiffs or against multiple defendants in a
single trial;14 compartmentalizing liability, compensation and
punishment decisions; 5 and effecting optimal deterrence to the
12 BEHAV. SC'. & L. 113 (1994) (finding that judges' and jurors' liability decisions and
perceptions of the trial were similarly influenced by exposure to potentially biasing, but
inadmissible, evidence).
" See Sarah Tanford & Michele Cox, The Effects of Impeachment Evidence
and Limiting Instructions on Individual and Group Decision Making, 12 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 477 (1988); Roselle L. Wissler & Michael J. Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting
Instructions: When Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide on Guilt, 9 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 37 (1985).
14 For empirical studies of multiple decisions in civil trials see, e.g., Irwin A.
Horowitz & Kenneth S. Bordens, The Effects of Jury Size, Evidence Complexity, and
Note Taking on Jury Process and Performance in a Civil Trial, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL.
121 (2002) (multiple plaintiffs in civil trial); Irwin A. Horowitz & Kenneth S. Bordens,
The Consolidation of Plaintiffs: The Effects of Number of Plaintiffs on Jurors' Liability
Decisions, Damage Awards, and Cognitive Processing of Evidence, 85 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 909 (2000) (civil trial-multiple plaintiffs); Kenneth S. Bordens & Irwin A.
Horowitz, The Limits of Sampling and Consolidation in Mass Tort Trials: Justice
Improved or Justice Altered?, 22 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 43 (1998). For empirical studies
of the effects of joinder in criminal cases see Kenneth S. Bordens & Irwin A. Horowitz,
Prejudicial Joinder of Multiple Offenses: Relative Effects of Cognitive Processing and
Criminal Schema, 7 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 243 (1986); Sarah Tanford,
Decision-Making Processes in Joined Criminal Trials, 12 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 367
(1985); Sarah Tanford & Steven Penrod, Social Inference Processes in Juror Judgments
of Multiple-Offense Trials, 47 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 749 (1984); Sarah
Tanford & Steven Penrod, Biases in Trials Involving Defendants Charged with
Multiple Offenses, 12 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 453 (1982); Irwin A. Horowitz, et al., A
Comparison of Verdicts Obtained in Severed and Joined Criminal Trials, 10 J. APPLIED
SOC. PSYCHOL. 444 (1980). See also review in Kenneth S. Bordens & Irwin A. Horowitz,
Joinder of Criminal Offenses: A Review of the Legal and Psychological Literature, 9
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 339 (1985).
" While some studies find that jurors and other legal decision makers are
somewhat successful at compartmentalizing information in deciding civil cases, other
studies demonstrate areas of difficulty. For empirical studies examining the possibility
of leakage among the different decisions jurors must make in civil cases see Corrine
Cather et al., Plaintiff Injury and Defendant Reprehensibility: Implications for
Compensatory and Punitive Damage Awards, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 189 (1996);
Michelle Chernikoff Anderson & Robert J. MacCoun, Goal Conflict in Juror
Assessments of Compensatory and Punitive Damages, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 313
(1999); Irwin A. Horowitz & Kenneth S. Bordens, An Experimental Investigation of
Procedural Issues in Complex Tort Trials, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 269 (1990);
MacCoun, supra note 5; Robbennolt, supra note 5; Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Christina
A. Studebaker, Anchoring in the Courtroom: The Effects of Caps on Punitive Damages,
23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 353 (1999); Roselle L. Wissler et al., The Impact of Jury
Instructions on the Fusion of Liability and Compensatory Damages, 25 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 125 (2001); Douglas J. Zickafoose & Brian H. Bornstein, Double Discounting:
The Effects of Comparative Negligence on Mock Juror Decision Making, 23 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 577 (1999). For empirical studies examining the effects of bifurcation in civil
cases, see Stephan Landsman et al., Be Careful What You Wish For: The Paradoxical
Effects of Bifurcating Claims for Punitive Damages, 1998 WiSc. L. REV. 297; Edith
Greene et al., Compensating Plaintiffs and Punishing Defendants: Is Bifurcation
Necessary?, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 187 (2000); Horowitz & Bordens, supra;
Robbennolt & Studebaker, supra. See also Hans Zeisel & Thomas Callahan, Split
Trials and Time Saving: A Statistical Analysis, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1606 (1963).
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exclusion of other goals. 6 In contrast to the legal and economic
models that portray jurors and other finders-of-fact as single-
mindedly pursuing individual, separable goals, we suggest that
legal decision makers attempt to best use the available verdict
options to satisfy numerous goals simultaneously.
B. Decision Makers as Goal Managers
Civil cases evoke multiple social and moral concerns,
both normative and non-normative, that factor into legal
decision making. For example, legal decision makers may
attempt to reach a verdict that is consistent with the available
evidence.' They may attempt to achieve distributive justice by
assessing liability proportionally with fault or by allocating
resources to each party in proportion to that party's need. 8
They may seek to compensate plaintiffs appropriately, avoiding
overcompensation and undercompensation. They may endeavor
to effect deterrence in some measure, exact retribution or
restore an appropriate balance of justice between the parties.'9
Just as the law more generally may serve an expressive
function,' ° so too may jurors attempt to express symbolic values
through their verdicts.2' In addition, jurors may show reactance
in the face of blatant manipulative tactics by counsel, attempt
to comply with economic logic and attempt to reconcile
conflicting (intrajuror and interjuror) interpretations of the
judge's instructions. At the same time, they may desire to
'6 See Cass R. Sunstein et al., Do People Want Optimal Deterrence?, 29 J.
LEGAL STUD. 237 (2000).
17 See Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, The Story Model for Juror Decision
Making, in INSIDE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING 192 (Reid
Hastie ed., 1993). For additional discussion of the story model of juror decision making
see infra Part III.B.
18 See Morton Deutsch, Equity, Equality, and Need: What Determines Which
Value Will be Used as the Basis of Distributive Justice, 31 J. SOC. ISSUES 137 (1975).
See also infra Part II.A.
19 See Edith Greene et al., The Effects of Limiting Punitive Damage Awards,
25 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 217, 229 (2001) (discussing mock jurors endorsement of
compensation, deterrence and punishment intentions); Reid Hastie et al., Juror
Judgments in Civil Cases: Effects of Plaintiffs Requests and Plaintiffs Identity on
Punitive Damage Awards, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 445, 462 (1999) (same). See also
Kevin M. Carlsmith et al., Why Do We Punish? Deterrence and Just Deserts as Motives
for Punishment, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 284 (2002) (examining different
punishment goals in criminal decision making); John M. Darley et al., Incapacitation
and Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 659 (2000) (same).
20 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U.
PA. L. REv. 2021 (1996).
21 See infra Parts II.B and II.C.
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"finish the trial and go home; avoid fighting with other jurors;
[and] avoid the wrath of the defendant, plaintiff, or
community., 22 While decision makers in civil cases may
struggle to satisfy this assortment of goals, the legal decision
making task affords only limited mechanisms through which to
do so-primarily, a liability verdict, compensatory damages
and, sometimes, punitive damages.
The array of possible goals and the avenues available to
accomplish them are interrelated in complex ways. We propose
four basic goal management principles that describe the
interrelated nature of these goals and actions. First, the
principle of equifinality holds that some goals may be
alternately satisfied through multiple pathways. Decision
makers, for example, can compensate the plaintiff most
straightforwardly through a compensatory damage award, but
can also award punitive damages to achieve this goal.23 Second,
the principle of best fit holds that pathways may sometimes
fulfill some goals better than others. For example,
compensatory damages may serve compensatory goals better
than they do retributive goals. Third, the principle of
multifinality holds that a particular pathway may accomplish
multiple goals simultaneously. Some of the decision makers'
objectives may be consistent with each other and may be
achieved concurrently. Requiring a defendant to pay money to
a plaintiff, for example, may serve to compensate the plaintiff,
to educate the defendant and others about socially acceptable
conduct and also to punish the defendant.24 Similarly, a
punitive damage award may fulfill goals of punishment and
deterrence. Finally, the principle of goal incompatibility holds
that some objectives will inevitably conflict and, thus, be
difficult or impossible to satisfy concurrently. For instance, a
particular punitive damages award may be thought to punish
appropriately the defendant, but to overcompensate the
22 Anderson & MacCoun, supra note 15, at 315 (internal citations omitted).
23 Arie W. Kruglanski et al., A Theory of Goal Systems, 34 ADVANCES
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 331, 334 (2002) (describing principle of equifinality). See
Anderson & MacCoun, supra note 15, at 315 ("We suggest that jurors manage goal
conflict through a principle of equifinality. By equifinality, we mean that actors can
pursue goals through multiple pathways; if one pathway is thwarted, another is used.")
(internal citations omitted).
24 Kruglanski et al., supra note 23, at 334 (describing principle of
multifinality).
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plaintiff. The challenge for jurors and other legal factfinders is
to reach a verdict that best reconciles these different goals.25
II. COMPETING GOALS
In addition to the traditional goals of the civil justice
system of determining liability, compensating plaintiffs and
deterring defendants, we suggest that there are numerous
other goals that play a role in deciding cases. When assessing
compensatory damages, for example, legal decision makers
may consider the relative needs of the parties rather than
solely attempting to reach outcomes that are proportionate to
fault. Moreover, decision makers may use their decisions as
much to "make statements" and endorse or reinforce
community values as to influence behavior directly. Thus, in
trying to understand decision making in civil cases, expressive
goals are an important consideration. In addition, legal
decision makers may be concerned not just with a commodified
conception of compensation, but also with restoring the moral
balance between the parties to the lawsuit.
A. Distributive Justice
Models of distributive justice attempt to explain how
people determine whether an outcome is fair. In general, the
law is intended to follow a model of distributive justice based
on allocation of fault such that a person is considered
blameworthy when she engages in conduct that causes
intended harm or involves an undue risk of harm.26 Under a
model of distributive justice based on fault, the losses resulting
from an injury-producing incident are allocated to each party in
proportion to that party's fault. A pure comparative negligence
standard can be thought of as following a proportionality
model.27
Psychologically, however, it is plausible that in
attempting to realize distributive justice among the parties,
decision makers may be motivated not only by a desire to
achieve an allocation of loss proportionate to fault, but also by
25 In Part III, we describe a constraint satisfaction perspective that might be
deployed to formalize these principles.
26 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS (5th
ed. 1984) (describing the fault principle).
27 But see Zickafoose & Bornstein, supra note 15 (finding that jurors have
difficulty implementing a pure comparative negligence standard).
2003] 1129
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a desire to allocate resources among the parties equally or in
proportion to each party's need.2" Empirical data suggest that
both motives may come into play when jurors are asked to
decide civil cases. Consistent with the traditional doctrine and
a norm of equity, Robert MacCoun found that jury pool
members, who were asked to decide a fictitious civil lawsuit,
strongly endorsed the notion that verdicts should be based on
fault, such that the agent at fault should bear the cost of the
injuries." At the same time, however, MacCoun also found
that, second to achieving fault-proportionality, the next most
commonly endorsed goal of mock jurors was to help needy
plaintiffs obtain compensation.0 This goal is consistent with a
norm of distributive justice based on need. Thus, jurors may
hold a defendant responsible in order to compensate the
plaintiff for her loss. Supporting this notion, a number of
empirical studies have found a relationship between injury
severity and civil liability, such that defendants are more likely
to be found liable for plaintiffs' injuries when those injuries are
31
more severe.
Each of these motives-equity, equality and need-
among others, may simultaneously exert influence on decision
makers attempting to make appropriate determinations in civil
cases. While one or another of these norms may predominate in
a given case or for a given decision within a case, other cases or
decisions may implicate several of the norms at the same
time.32 Accordingly, decision makers must attempt to balance
the competing concerns of the different distributive justice
principles in order to satisfy concurrently their competing
goals.
28 See Deutsch, supra note 18.
29 MacCoun, supra note 5, at 133.
30 Id.
31 See, e.g., Brian H. Bornstein, From Compassion to Compensation: The
Effect of Injury Severity on Mock Jurors' Liability Judgments, 28 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1477 (1998); Troyen A. Brennan et al., Relation Between Negligent Adverse
Events and the Outcomes of Medical-Malpractice Litigation, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1963 (1996). But see Edward Green, The Reasonable Man: Legal Fiction or Psychosocial
Reality?, 2 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 241 (1967); MARK A. PETERSON, COMPENSATION OF
INJURIES: CIVIL JURY VERDICTS IN COOK COUNTY (1984). See review in Jennifer K.
Robbennolt, Outcome Severity and Judgments of "Responsibility": A Meta-Analytic
Review, 30 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 2575 (2000) (finding a statistically significant,
but small association).
32 See Deutsch, supra note 18, at 143-47 (discussing the conditions under
which each norm is likely to emerge).
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B. Value Expression
Another class of goals that may influence legal decisions
is related to the expressive functions such decisions can serve.
The law functions expressively to the extent that its role is
more symbolic than instrumental, as it focuses on "'making
statements' as opposed to controlling behavior directly."33
. Similarly, civil factfinders who hold a defendant liable
for a civil wrong and require that defendant to compensate the
plaintiff for her injuries make statements about socially
acceptable and unacceptable behavior as well as the
appropriate relationship between the parties. In particular,
punishment, including civil punishment, is said to serve, in
part, the symbolic function of expressing "moral
condemnation," 4 "attitudes of resentment and indignation, and
. . . judgments of disapproval and reprobation."35 As Joel
Feinberg says of punitive damages: "What more dramatic way
of vindicating his violated right can be imagined than to have a
court thus forcibly condemn its violation through the symbolic
machinery of punishment?" 6 Although deterrence theories can
accommodate such expressions by interpreting them post hoc
as threats or incentives, we believe that a rational choice
perspective fails to capture the complexity and emotional
resonance of these more symbolic messages. The following
discussion of attitude functions, sacred value protections, taboo
trade-offs and incommensurability highlights this complexity.
1. Attitude Functions
The functional attitude tradition in social psychology
suggests that attitude expressions may serve a variety of
functions and may even serve more than one function or goal
simultaneously. Importantly, in addition to holding and
Sunstein, supra note 20, at 2024.
34 Dan M. Kahan, Punishment Incommensurability, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.
691, 696 (1998) ("Since condemning is central to what society is trying to accomplish
when it punishes, substituting a form of affliction that doesn't convey that meaning for
one that does is expressively irrational."); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative
Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591 (1996).
35 Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in DOING AND
DESERVING 95, 98 (1970) ("Punishment, in short, has a symbolic significance largely
missing from other kinds of penalties."). Jean Hampton, An Expressive Theory of
Retribution, in RETRIBUTIVISM & ITS CRITICS (Wesley Cragg ed., 1992) (discussing the
expressive function of punishment generally).
36 Feinberg, supra note 35, at 104.
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expressing attitudes on utilitarian or instrumental grounds
such as structuring knowledge or as a result of the rewards or
punishments associated with the object of the attitude, people
may also hold and express attitudes for symbolic or expressive
reasons." Attitudes serve value-expressive functions when they
are "based on needs to define oneself by expressing important
values and aligning oneself with important reference groups. " "
A particular attitude may function primarily to fulfill
instrumental or expressive goals, to fulfill both types of goals
simultaneously (a "complex attitude"), or to fulfill neither
instrumental nor expressive goals (a "nonfunctional
attitude").39 Features of the individual holding the attitude, of
the attitude object and of the situation calling for an attitude
expression may all interact to determine whether a particular
function or functions is elicited. °  Consistent with this
functional understanding of attitudes, Gregory Herek and John
Capitanio found, for example, that attitudes toward people
with AIDS are motivated both by evaluative concerns (personal
apprehension about contracting HIV) and expressive concerns
(conveying political or religious values), with expressive
17 See generally ALICE H. EAGLY & SHELLY CHAIKEN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
ATTITUDES 479-90 (Dawn Youngblood ed., 1993); WHY WE EVALUATE: FUNCTIONS OF
ATITUDES (Gregory R. Maio & James M. Olson eds., 2000); Gregory M. Herek, Can
Functions be Measured? A New Perspective on the Functional Approach to Attitudes, 50
SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 285 (1987) (describing methods for studying attitude functions)
[hereinafter Functional Approach]; Gregory M. Herek, The Instrumentality of
Attitudes: Toward a Neofunctional Theory, 42 J. SOC. ISSUES 99 (1986) [hereinafter
Neofunctional Theory]. For related work on symbolic politics, see David 0. Sears & C.L.
Funk, The Role of Self-Interest in Social and Political Attitudes, 24 ADVANCES
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1 (1991); David 0. Sears et al., Self-Interest vs. Symbolic
Politics in Policy Attitudes and Presidential Voting, 74 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 670 (1980).
In a similar way, the Heuristic-Systematic Model of persuasion proposes that
systematic processing of attitude-relevant information is motivated not only by an
instrumental concern for accuracy (i.e., "achieving valid attitudes that square with
relevant facts"), but also by expressive concerns such as defense motivation (i.e., "the
desire to form or to defend particular attitudinal positions") and impression motivation
(i.e., "the desire to express attitudes that are socially acceptable"). See EAGLY &
CHAIKEN, supra, at 339-40; Roger Giner-Sorolla & Shelly Chaiken, Selective Use of
Heuristic and Systematic Processing Under Defense Motivation, 23 PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 84 (1997) (testing defense motivations); Serena Chen et al.,
Getting at the Truth or Getting Along: Accuracy- Versus Impression-Motivated Heuristic
and Systematic Processing, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 262 (1996)
(contrasting the processing and expressions of accuracy- and impression-motivated
participants).
'8 Herek, Neofunctional Theory, supra note 37, at 106. Herek also identifies
two other expressive functions: social-expressive (based on needs for acceptance) and
defensive (based on needs to reduce anxiety). Id.
'9 Id. at 106-07.
40 Herek, Functional Approach, supra note 37, at 299-301.
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concerns predominating.4' Similarly, both value-expressive
symbolic considerations and instrumental concerns for
controlling behavior have been shown to underlie support for
capital punishment, though there is evidence that symbolic
concerns predominate.2
2. Sacred Value Protection
Philip Tetlock has recently proposed a model of behavior
that suggests that, in addition to other goals, people may
attempt to symbolically affirm core values that they believe
have been threatened.43 Specifically, people will act to defend
those "sacred values" that are "implicitly or explicitly treat[ed]
as possessing infinite or transcendental significance that
precludes comparisons, trade-offs, or indeed any other mingling
with bounded or secular values."4 In his "sacred value
protection model," Tetlock provides evidence that, in the face of
a perceived threat to one of these central beliefs, people will
endeavor to "protect their private selves and public identities
from moral contamination by impure thoughts and deeds."45
The sacred value protection model posits that
witnessing incursions onto sacred values triggers responses
that attempt to re-affirm those values. First, the model posits
41 Gregory M. Herek & John P. Capitanio, Symbolic Prejudice or Fear of
Infection? A Functional Analysis of AIDS-Related Stigma Among Heterosexual Adults,
20 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 230, 236 (1998).
42 See Tom R. Tyler & Renee Weber, Support for the Death Penalty:
Instrumental Response to Crime, or Symbolic Attitude?, 17 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 21 (1982).
See also Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Samuel R. Gross, Hardening of the Attitudes:
Americans' Views on the Death Penalty, 50 J. Soc. IssuEs 19 (1994).
43 Philip E. Tetlock et al., The Psychology of the Unthinkable: Taboo Trade
Offs, Forbidden Base Rates, and Heretical Counterfactuals, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 853 (2000); Philip E. Tetlock, Social Functionalist Frameworks for Judgment
and Choice: Intuitive Politicians, Theologians, and Prosecutors, 109 PSYCHOL. REV. 451
(2002).
44 Tetlock et al., supra note 43, at 853. See also Tetlock, supra note 43, at 454
(stating that sacred values are "values that-by community consensus-are deemed
beyond quantification or fungibility").
45 Tetlock et al., supra note 43, at 853 (portraying people as "struggling to
protect sacred values from secular encroachments by increasingly powerful societal
trends toward market capitalism (and the attendant pressure to render everything
fungible) and scientific naturalism (and the attendant pressure to pursue inquiry
wherever it logically leads)"); Tetlock, supra note 43, at 458 ("[Tjhe principled defense
of the sacred from encroachments by powerful societal trends toward science,
technology, and the calculus of capitalism (and attendant pressures to pursue inquiry
wherever it leads and to translate all values into a utility or monetary metric)."). In
this way, Tetlock suggests that people operate as intuitive theologians (as compared to
intuitive scientists, economists, politicians or prosecutors). Tetlock et al., supra note 43,
at 853-54.
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that people will respond with moral outrage when core values
are threatened.46 Moral outrage has been shown to manifest
itself in negative evaluations of, and negative emotional
responses, such as anger, toward individuals who have
intruded on closely held values. Moral outrage also leads to
greater support for the punishment of those who have
threatened these moral norms.47 This connection between
feelings of moral outrage and punitiveness is also supported by
research on the psychology of punitive damages awards, which
has demonstrated that jurors' feelings of moral outrage about a
defendant's conduct predict the degree to which they believe
that the defendant ought to be punished.48
Second, the model predicts that threats to sacred values
will elicit expressions of moral cleansing that are designed to
distance the witness from the offense and to buttress the
threatened principles. 9 In this way, the witness affirms the
closely held value and upholds his or her connection to the
moral community. ° For example, people who observe a decision
that threatens a sacred value, such as the selling of bodily
organs to the highest bidder, are more likely to volunteer for a
campaign to promote organ donation than are those who do not
observe such a decision."1 This behavior serves to distance them
from the offensive trade-off and affirms the threatened sacred
value.
3. Taboo Trade-Offs and Incommensurability
One type of threat to sacred values occurs when decision
makers entertain what are considered to be illegitimate
comparisons between entities and values that defy comparison.
In their theory of "taboo trade-offs," Alan Page Fiske and Philip
46 Tetlock et al., supra note 43, at 855.
47 Alan Page Fiske & Philip E. Tetlock, Taboo Trade-Offs: Reactions to
Transactions that Transgress the Spheres of Justice, 18 POL. PSYCHOL. 255, 285-86
(1997). For empirical evidence that taboo trade-offs elicit greater outrage see Tetlock et
al., supra note 43, at 857-59; Philip E. Tetlock et al., Revising the Value Pluralism
Model: Incorporating Social Content and Context Postulates, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
VALUES: THE ONTARIO SYMPOSIUM 25 (Clive Seligman et al. eds., 1996).
See Daniel Kahneman et al., Shared Outrage and Erratic Awards: The
Psychology of Punitive Damages, 16 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 49, 62 (1998); Cass R.
Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in
the Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071 (1998).
49 Tetlock et al., supra note 43, at 853-54.
50 Id. at 855.
51 Id. at 858-59.
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Tetlock brought together Fiske's theory of relational models52
and Tetlock's work on the psychology of value trade-offs" to
explain when trade-offs will be viewed as illegitimate (or
taboo). 4  Fiske posited four fundamental models that
individuals in society use to structure their social relations.
First, in relations governed by communal sharing, we classify
individuals into groups and treat members of a class
identically.55 Second, authority ranking is a relational model in
which we treat individuals by their rank within the hierarchy
of a group." Third, in relations governed by equality matching,
we keep track of contributions and outcomes and attempt to
keep them in balance. 7 Finally, relations governed by market
pricing operate in terms of exchange, as we value factors on an
absolute metric and make trade-offs among them." Each
relational model operates to appropriately govern different
consensually agreed upon spheres of the social community.
Moreover, different relational operations, modes of conduct and
norms of distributive justice are appropriate within
relationships governed by different relational models.59
A taboo trade-off occurs when there is a comparison or
exchange between relationships that are treated as
appropriately falling into different relational domains. This is
particularly the case when a relationship appropriately treated
with market pricing is compared or exchanged with
relationships normally falling into one of the alternative
relational models: communal sharing, authority ranking or
equality matching. Especially proscribed are those trade-offs
that "treat 'sacred values' like honor, love, justice, and life as
fungible."" Thus, exchanges of money for things such as votes,
5' Alan Page Fiske, The Four Elementary Forms of Sociality: Framework for a
Unified Theory of Social Relations, 99 PSYCHOL. REV. 689 (1992).
"' See Philip E. Tetlock, A Value Pluralism Model of Ideological Reasoning,
50 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 819 (1986); Tetlock et al., supra note 43.
' Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 47.
55 Fiske, supra note 52, at 690-91.
' Id. at 691.
57 id.
58 Id. at 691-92.
'9 See id. at 693-708; Robert J. MacCoun, The Costs and Benefits of Letting
Juries Punish Corporations: Comment on Viscusi, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1821 (2000).
60 Tetlock et al., supra note 43, at 854; Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 47, at 256
("By a taboo trade-off, we mean any explicit mental comparison or social transaction
that violates deeply-held normative intuitions about the integrity, even sanctity, of
certain forms of relationship and of the moral-political values that derive from those
relationships.").
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babies, loyalty or love strike most people as distasteful and
morally offensive."'
Such negative reactions are likely due, in part, to the
cognitive difficulty that individuals have with comparing and
making trade-offs between incommensurable entities." The
lack of a common metric for evaluating things such as money
and love make any comparison and attempt to make trade-offs
cognitively challenging. However, Fiske and Tetlock suggest
that this "resistance also runs deeper: there are moral limits to
fungibility. People reject certain comparisons because they feel
that seriously considering the relevant trade-offs would
undercut their self-images and social identities as moral
beings."63 Fiske and Tetlock invoke the concept of "constitutive
commensurability" to describe instances in which "entering one
value into a trade-off calculus with the other subverts or
undermines that value. This means that our relationships with
each other preclude certain comparisons among values."64 In
these cases, it is not merely that the trade-off is cognitively
complex or that we think that a proper quantitative valuation
has not been achieved monetarily, i.e., that not enough money
has been paid for the baby or the organ. Rather, the difficulty
comes from a belief that to value some things in monetary
terms is qualitatively incorrect; such comparisons invoke the
wrong relational template and, accordingly, the valuation is of
the wrong type.65
6' Tetlock et al., supra note 43, at 854 ("To transgress this boundary, to
attach a monetary value to one's friendships, children, or loyalty to one's country, is to
disqualify oneself from the accompanying social roles."); Fiske & Tetlock, supra note
47, at 292 ("People probably cannot make reliable, meaningful comparisons across
relational models, and they experience deep unease when asked to do so.").
6' For discussions of incommensurability in law generally, see Margaret Jane
Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE L.J. 56 (1993); Cass R.
Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779 (1994).
Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 47, at 256.
Id. See also Sunstein, supra note 62, at 796 ("Incommensurability occurs
when the relevant goods cannot be aligned along a single metric without doing violence
to our considered judgments about how these goods are best characterized.") (emphasis
omitted); Kahan, Punishment Incommensurability, supra note 34, at 695
("[Slignification of respect cannot be reproduced by any amount of money; even to
attempt the substitution conveys that he does not value his colleague in the way
appropriate to their relationship.").
65 Sunstein, supra note 62, at 788 ("We should distinguish between cases in
which a monetary offer is entirely inappropriate ... and cases in which the monetary
sum, while appropriately offered, does not reflect a full or fully accurate valuation of
the item in question."); id. at 795 ("But perhaps the resistance [to comparisons between
money and risk to life or health] rests on a claim about appropriate kinds, not levels, of
valuation."). Resource theory also suggests that different resource classes (love, status,
information, money, goods and services) are not equally substitutable. See, e.g.,
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As with other threats to sacred values, taboo trade-offs
engender feelings of anger and outrage, negative attributions
about those entertaining such comparisons, a desire to punish
such offenders and a need to engage in moral cleansing.66
Punishment is central to symbolically restoring sacred values:
[01nly reassurance that the wrong-doer has indeed been punished by
the collective (whose norms have been violated) should be sufficient
to restore the moral status quo ante and to reduce whatever
cognitive and emotional unease was produced in individual
observers by the original trade-off transgression. Indeed,
punishments are forceful impositions of the relational models
67
themselves, reestablishing their validity and hegemony.
Accordingly, we might expect civil decision makers to react
negatively to, and to express their discomfort punitively
against, defendants who have made or entertained taboo trade-
offs.
68
4. Resistance to Cost-Benefit Analysis
Legal scholars have also noted this deeper reaction to
taboo trade-offs. Cass Sunstein writes that
many people find it jarring to hear that, in light of actual
occupational choices, a worker values his life at (say) eight million
dollars, or that the protection of a life is "worth" eight million
dollars. These claims are jarring not because we believe infinite
social resources should be devoted to occupational safety. The claims
are jarring because of the widespread perception that a life is not
instrumental to some aggregate social goal, but worthy in itself-a
belief in tension with applying the language of prices to human life.
This is a plausible concern even if one ultimately concludes that
(say) an eight million dollar expenditure is fully appropriate in cases
of lives at risk. Certainly intrinsic goods do not have infinite value
for purposes of law and policy. But even though they do not, the fact
Gregory V. Donnenwerth & Uriel G. Foa, Effect of Resource Class on Retaliation to
Injustice in Interpersonal Exchange, 29 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 785 (1974);
J.L. Turner, Edna B. Foa & Uriel G. Foa, Interpersonal Reinforcers: Classification,
Interrelationship and Some Differential Properties, 19 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
168 (1971).
Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 47, at 285 (moral outrage).
Indeed, people tend to deny the necessity for many trade-offs, and are often
distressed, angry, or confused when faced with the finds of explicit trade-offs
we have been discussing. People commonly censure those who make such
trade-offs explicit because they regard such trade-offs as transgressions
indicative of aberrant, antisocial motives that threaten the social order.
Id. at 282. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
67 Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 47, at 286.
68 See MacCoun, supra note 59.
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that we find it jarring to hear that a life is "worth" a specified
amount of money is socially desirable, and not a product of simple
confusion.65
Consistent with this observation and the theory of taboo
trade-offs, recent empirical evidence suggests that civil jurors
may be more punitive against companies that undertake cost-
benefit analyses in making safety decisions than they are
against those who do not. W. Kip Viscusi examined the effect of
corporate cost-benefit analyses on mock jurors using a scenario
in which a defendant automobile company manufactured a line
of cars with a defective electrical system which led to a
specified number of burn deaths per year. ° The study used two
versions of the case; in one version, the company used a cost-
benefit analysis to decide that it should not change the
defective design to prevent this risk.71 Jurors appeared to react
negatively to evidence that the company had conducted a cost-
benefit analysis. Viscusi found that jurors were more likely to
award punitive damages and made marginally larger punitive
damage awards when the company conducted a cost-benefit
analysis."
These findings, though preliminary,3 are consistent
with common intuitions about the effects of corporate cost-
benefit analysis on jurors.74 The theory of taboo trade-offs
provides a psychologically sophisticated explanation for these
findings and suggests that symbolic motives may have an
influence on legal judgments. It is possible that by punishing
69 Sunstein, supra note 62, at 804.
70 W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?, 52 STAN. L. REV.
547 (2000).
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Additional research is needed to disentangle the multiple conditions in
Viscusi's study and to explore the boundary conditions on any effects. See, e.g., Kevin
M. O'Neil et al., Companies' Risky Decisions: Jurors Reactions to Cost-Benefit
Analyses (March 8, 2002) (unpublished paper presented at American Psychology-Law
Society Biennial Meeting, Austin, TX).
74 Steven Garber, Product Liability, Punitive Damages, Business Decisions
and Economic Outcomes, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 237, 287 n.135 ("It seems widely agreed by
both plaintiffs' and defense attorneys that credible trial evidence of cost-benefit
balancing-so-called 'trading off lives against dollars'-makes punitive damages
particularly likely. This is in stark contrast to the fact that economic efficiency-and
deterrence aimed at economic efficiency-requires cost-benefit balancing."). See also
Mark Dowie, Pinto Madness, MOTHER JONES, Sept.-Oct. 1977, at 18 (describing the
controversy over the revelation that the Ford Motor Company relied on a cost-benefit
analysis in deciding against an eleven dollar safety alteration in each Ford Pinto,
despite their anticipation that this could prevent almost two hundred burn deaths).
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the corporation through a punitive damage award, the mock
jurors were attempting to distance themselves morally from
the proscribed trade-off and symbolically reaffirm the value
that they and their moral community place on life and safety.75
C. Restoring Moral Balance
1. Valuing the Victim
In similar ways, legal decision makers may also attempt
to express support for the value of the victim of the wrongdoing
through their verdicts. Philosopher Jean Hampton has
developed an expressive theory of retribution based on the
messages that wrongful behavior and sanctions send about the
relative worth of the parties.7" Hampton posits that
[a] person behaves wrongfully in a way that effects a moral injury to
another when she treats that person in a way that is precluded by
that person's value, and/or by representing him as worth far less
than his actual value; or in other words, when the meaning of her
action is such that she diminishes him, and by doing so, represents
herself as elevated with respect to him, thereby according herself a
value that she does not have.77
When a wrongdoer engages in behavior that does not
appropriately respect the value of another person, it "sends a
false message about the value of the victim relative to the
[wrongdoer]." 78 Such an action symbolically "demonstrates that
she believes the worth of the victim makes such treatment
permissible."79
To illustrate the message about the victim's worth sent
by a wrongful act, Hampton uses the example of an asbestos
75 See MacCoun, supra note 59.
76 See Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of
Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1677 (1992).
77 Id.; Hampton, supra note 35; Jean Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in
FORGIVENESS AND MERCY, supra note 77, at 111.
78 Hampton, supra note 35, at 5. See also Hampton, supra note 76, at 1678
("[Hiarms anger us not merely because they cause suffering we have to see in others,
but also because we see their inflictions as violative of the victim's entitlements given
her value.").
'9 Hampton, supra note 35, at 8. See also Hampton, supra note 77, at 44
("When someone wrongs another, she does not regard her victim as the sort of person
who is valuable enough to require better treatment."). See also Jeffrie Murphy,
Forgiveness and Resentment, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY, supra note 77, at 14, 25
("[S]uch injuries are also messages-symbolic communications. They are ways a
wrongdoer has of saying to us, 'I count but you do not,' 'I can use you for my purposes,'
or 'I am here up high and you are there down below."').
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plant, where managers know the health risks, but fail to warn
and protect their employees.
Their actions demonstrate how important the company's profits are
to these managers: in virtue of their importance, they regard it as
permissible to allow the employees to assume these risks to their
health, rather than pay the costs necessary to do something to lower
the risks and thereby lower profits. Those who commit such crimes
essentially reason: "Nothing personal, but I've got to harm you in
these ways given my interests-which are so important that you can
be used or damaged to serve them." Such reasoning explains why
these people inflict treatment upon others which is disrespectful of
their value as persons.80
Similarly, Marc Galanter and David Luban argue that
"culpably harming another person or being culpably negligent
expresses a false view of the wrongdoer's value relative to that
of the victim. . . . 'I can be negligent in marketing Dalkon
Shields because you, the customer, do not matter very much."'
8
'
Hampton argues that civil punishment is a way of
attempting to reestablish the value of equality; that is to
"remake the world in a way that denies what the wrongdoer's
events have attempted to establish, thereby lowering the
wrongdoer, elevating the victim, and annulling the act of
diminishment."2 Because the message sent by the wrongful act
"threatens to reinforce belief in the wrong theory of value by
the community," 3 punishment is sought that "symbolizes the
correct relative value of wrongdoer and victim."4 Galanter and
Luban characterize this purpose for punishment as inflicting
an "expressive defeat" on the wrongdoer.85
This philosophical account of retribution is consistent
with the social psychological account provided by equity theory.
80 Hampton, supra note 35, at 8.
81 Galanter & Luban, supra note 4, at 1432.
82 Hampton, supra note 76, at 1686-87. See also Hampton, supra note 35, at
12 ("a way of denying a false message about worth, and thus a way of vindicating the
worth of those who have been victims of wrongdoing").
Hampton, supra note 76, at 1678.
84 Hampton, supra note 77, at 125. See also Hampton, supra note 35, at 13
("[Jiust as the crime has symbolic meaning, so too does the punishment.... the
punishment 'takes back' the demeaning message .... the evidence of value loss
provided by the crime is nullified by the new evidence provided by the subordination
effected through the punishment."); Hampton, supra note 76, at 1686 ("[Rletribution is
a response to a wrong that is intended to vindicate the value of the victim denied by the
wrongdoer's action through the construction of an event that not only repudiates the
action's message of superiority over the victim but does so in a way that confirms them
as equal by virtue of their humanity.").
85 Galanter & Luban, supra note 4, at 1432.
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According to equity theorists, a wrongdoer's transgression
against an injured party results in an inequity in their
relationship; that is, the wrong creates a moral imbalance
between the parties. 6 Moreover, equity theory posits that
"when individuals find themselves participating in inequitable
relationships, they become distressed. The more inequitable
the relationship, the more distress individuals feel."" Upon
discovering that a relationship is inequitable, individuals are
motivated to attempt to restore equity to the relationship.88
This is true, not only for participants in the relationship, but
also for impartial observers, such as jurors or other legal
factfinders. "When participants are unable-or refuse-to
restore equity, impartial observers often intervene and attempt
to set things right." 9 Thus, civil verdicts may reflect, in part,
decision makers' attempts to restore moral balance to the
relationship between the parties.
In affirming the proper moral balance between the
parties, civil sanctions may restore corrective justice by
adjusting "an unjustified state of affairs between an injurer
and a victim, when the injurer's activity has caused the
injustice, so that such changes bring about a just state of
affairs between them, and one that is related in a morally
appropriate way to the status quo ante."9 ° Interestingly, tort
litigants themselves may share this restorative goal with
jurors. Both tort plaintiffs and tort defendants appear to care
as much about receiving dignified and respectful treatment,
and a chance to "tell their story," as about the actual monetary
outcomes at stake.91
86 See Elaine Walster et al., New Directions in Equity Research, 25 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 151 (1973).
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 William Auston et al., Equity and the Law: The Effect of a Harmdoer's
"Suffering in the Act" on Liking and Assigned Punishment, 9 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 163, 169 (1976). See also Alan L. Chaiken & John M. Darley, Victim or
Perpetrator?: Defensive Attribution of Responsibility and the Need for Order and
Justice, 25 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 268 (1973),
Radin, supra note 62, at 60.
91 See E. Allan Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants'
Evaluations of their Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 LAW & SOCY REV. 953
(1990); ROBERT J. MACCOUN ET AL., ALTERNATIVE ADJUDICATION: AN EVALUATION OF
THE NEW JERSEY AUTOMOBILE ARBITRATION PROGRAM (1988).
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2. Punitive Damages as Restorative
In one demonstration that jurors may pursue
restorative or expressive goals, Michelle Chernikoff Anderson
and Robert MacCoun examined the potential influences on
juror decision making of whether the punitive damage award is
to be paid to the plaintiff or to the state.92 While punitive
damage awards are traditionally paid to the plaintiff who
brought the case, a number of states have passed legislation
that allocates some portion of the punitive damage award to
the state.9" Such legislation responds to concerns that plaintiffs
receive a windfall when they receive punitive damage awards
that are intended to punish the defendant, in addition to
damages intended to compensate them for their losses.94
Counter to many commentators' intuition that
allocating punitive damages awards to the state will result in
an increase in the likelihood and size of such awards,99
92 Anderson & MacCoun, supra note 15.
93 Statutes that allocate punitive damages to the state are often called "split-
recovery" statutes. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020(j) (LEXIS 1997) (50% to general
state fund); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e)(2) (2000) (in products liability actions, 75%
less costs and fees to Office of the Treasury and Fiscal Services) (see State v. Moseley,
436 S.E.2d 632 (Ga. 1993), cert. denied 511 U.S. 1107 (1994) (upholding statute)); 735
ILL. COMP. STAT. 2-1207 (1992) (court may apportion award among plaintiff, plaintiffs
attorney and State Department of Human Services); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-51-3-6 (West
1999) (75% to Violent Crimes Victims Compensation Fund); IOWA CODE ANN. §
668A.1(2) (West 1998) (under some circumstances, 75% to civil reparations trust fund);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.675(3) (West supp. 2003) (50% to Tort Victims' Compensation
Fund); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.540 (1999) (60% to Criminal Injuries Compensation
Account); 73 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2105(3) (West 2001) (court has discretion to select
organization(s) "engaged in charitable or educational activities involving the fine arts"
to receive award); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(3) (2000) (50% of amount in excess of
$20,000 less fees and costs to general state fund). But see ALA. CODE § 6-11-21(1) (1999)
(no portion of the punitive damage award shall be allocated to the state). Provisions
allocating punitive damage awards to the state have been challenged on both state and
federal constitutional grounds. For cases upholding split-recovery statutes, see Gordon
v. Florida, 608 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1992); Mack Trucks v. Conkle, 436 S.E.2d 635 (Ga.
1993); Shepherd Components v. Brice Petrides-Donohue & Associates, 473 N.W.2d 612
(Iowa 1991); Fust v. Missouri, 947 S.W.2d 424 (Mo. 1997); Hoskins v. Business Men's
Assurance, 79 S.W.2d 901 (Mo. 2002); DeMendoza v. Huffman, 51 P.3d 1232 (Or. 2002).
But see Kirk v. Denver Publ'g Co., 818 P.2d 262 (Colo. 1991) (holding Colorado
provision unconstitutional in violation of the takings clauses of the state and federal
constitutions).
" See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 59 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
("Punitive damages are generally seen as a windfall to plaintiffs, who are entitled to
receive full compensation for their injuries-but no more. Even assuming that a
punitive 'fine' should be imposed after a civil trial, the penalty should go to the State,
not to the plaintiff-who by hypothesis is fully compensated.").
95 First, it is thought that if punitive damages are awarded to the state,
jurors will be relieved of any concern about awarding a windfall to the plaintiff and will
feel free to fully punish the defendant. E. Jeffrey Grube, Punitive Damages: A
1142 [Vol. 68: 4
DECISION MAKERS AS GOAL MANAGERS
Anderson and MacCoun found that mock jurors were more
likely to award punitive damages in personal injury cases when
they were to be awarded to the plaintiff than when they were
to be awarded to the state.9 This was true both when the state
treasury was to receive the award" and when a consortium of
relatively uncontroversial state funds was to receive the
award. 8 Because participants already had an opportunity to
compensate the plaintiff through compensatory damages,
Anderson and MacCoun suggested that punitive damages serve
a symbolic restorative function that is dependent on receipt by
the plaintiff.' In such a relational capacity, punitive damages
may advance a societal interest in mending the breach caused
by the defendant's reprehensible actions.00
Misplaced Remedy, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 839, 855 (1993). Second, because judges and
jurors are residents and taxpayers in the states that would be receiving the award,
they have some interest in the amount of the award and, accordingly, may award
higher amounts in punitive damages than they would if the entire award was to go to
the plaintiff. Development in the Law--Jury Determination of Punitive Damages, 110
HARv. L. REV. 1513, 1535 (1997) [hereinafter Jury Determination]; Michelle Riley
Stephens, Punitive Damages: Making the Plaintiff Whole or Making the State Wealthy?,
19 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 698, 700 (1996). Moreover, if the portion of the punitive
damage award allocated to the state is directed to a state fund which jurors perceive as
a "good cause," the temptation, again, may be to increase the punitive damages
assessed. Jury Determination, supra, at 1535-36. One commentator stated the intuition
thus: "If jurors realized that any punitive damage award were to be returned to public
use, the size of the awards would not simply skyrocket. They would follow the Voyager
spacecraft out of the solar system." Steven J. Sensibar, Punitive Damages: A Look at
Origins and Legitimacy, 41 FED'N INS. & CORP. COUNS. Q. 375, 387 (1991). Indeed, in
response to such concerns, some states do not inform the jury that part of the punitive
damage award will go to the state. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-11-21(g) (1999) ("jury may
neither be instructed nor informed"); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-51-3-3 (West 1999) (the jury
may not be informed of the allocation of punitive damage awards). But see Shari
Seidman Diamond & Jonathan D. Casper, Blindfolding the Jury to Verdict
Consequences: Damages, Experts, and the Civil Jury, 26 LAW & Socy REV. 513, 518
(1992) (discussing the consequences of keeping information from the jury).
Anderson & MacCoun, supra note 15, at 320-21 (finding, however, no
differences in the size of awards).
9' Id. (study 1).
98 Id. at 325 (study 2). The charities used were adapted from the tax donation
charities listed on the 1995 California state income tax form: State Children's Trust
Fund for the Prevention of Child Abuse; California Breast Cancer Research Fund;
California Firefighters' Memorial Fund; California Public School Library Protection
Fund; and California Infectious Disease Research Fund. Id. at 323.
Id. at 326-27. See also G. Bazemore and M. Umbreit, Rethinking the
Sanctioning Function in Juvenile Court: Retributive or Restorative Responses to Youth
Crime, 41 CRIME & DELINQ. 296 (1995).
" Jonathan Baron & Ilana Ritov, Intuitions about Penalties and
Compensation in the Context of Tort Law, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 17, 25 (1993)
(finding that twenty-four of eighty-three participants awarded greater amounts of
compensation when the money was to be paid directly to the plaintiff than when a
penalty was to go to the government who would then compensate the injured party
(only four participants paid less)). They conclude that "many people assign
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Writing about a non-commodified conception of
compensation, Radin suggests that compensation can serve to
restore the moral balance between the parties by "symboliz[ing]
public respect for rights and public recognition of the
transgressor's fault by requiring something important to be
given up on one side and received on the other, even if there is
no equivalence of value possible."'' Similarly, a punitive
damages award, specifically required to be paid by the
wrongdoer to the injured party, may affirm the appropriate
value of the injured party vis-A-vis the wrongdoer.
3. Apologies
While the payment of money by the defendant to the
plaintiff may sometimes serve the expressive purpose of
reestablishing respect for the victim of wrongdoing, it may not
always be the only or the most satisfactory pathway for
accomplishing this goal. At least in some contexts, "the medium
of monetary damages has very limited expressive power," 1°2 and
may suggest an inappropriate valuing of the victim.0 3
An alternative mechanism by which the appropriate
moral balance between the parties can be restored is an
apology given by the wrongdoer to the victim. Indeed, equity
theorists have suggested that one possible means through
which equity might be restored to the relationship between the
parties is for the wrongdoer to offer an apology.04 To apologize
is to engage in a social "ritual whereby the wrongdoer can
symbolically bring himself low (or raise us up)."0 5 Jonathan
Cohen suggests that, in some cases, "[p]aying monetary
damages may help take care of the financial consequences of an
injury, but it may take an apology to 'wipe the moral ledger'
clean and construct an understanding of the injury and the
relationship which both parties can accept.
" °0
compensation not in terms of the injury but rather in terms of setting the balance right
between the injurer, if any, and the victim." Id. at 31.
'o' Radin, supra note 62, at 69.
'02 Galanter & Luban, supra note 4, at 1439 (suggesting that juries provide an
explanation for their punitive damages, to spell out the retributive message).
103 See Sunstein, supra note 20, at 2036 ("A complex network of social norms
governs the acceptable uses of money.").
'04 Walster et al., supra note 86.
'05 Murphy, supra note 79, at 28.
'm Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1009,
1020 (1999). Intuitively, it seems central to an apology that the apology be offered to
the injured party. See Damon Hack, Moss Sorry for Car Incident, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27,
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Accordingly, as sociologist Nicholas Tavuchis recognizes,
[glenuine apologies ... may be taken as the symbolic foci of secular
remedial rituals that serve to recall and reaffirm allegiance to codes
of behavior and belief whose integrity has been tested and
challenged by transgression, whether knowingly or unwittingly. An
apology thus speaks to an act that cannot be undone but that cannot
go unnoticed without compromising the current and future
relationship of the parties, the legitimacy of the violated rule, and
the wider social web in which the participants are enmeshed.
10 7
Similarly, Hampton argues that, "by apologizing, we deny the
diminishment of the victim, and our relative elevation,
expressed by our wrongful action."' In this way, an apology
offered by the transgressor to the victim may repair the breach
created by the wrongful conduct and affirm the relative value
of the parties."9
Indeed, experimental studies of apologies in non-legal
contexts have found that apologies, or other expressions of
remorse, affect decision making in numerous ways, influencing
attributions of responsibility for the incident, beliefs about the
stability of the behavior (i.e., its likelihood of recurrence),
perceptions of the character of the wrongdoer, affective
reactions such as anger and sympathy, and behaviors such as
forgiveness, aggression and recommendations for
punishment.1 In addition, experimental studies of reactions to
2002, at D8 (describing football player Randy Moss' apology to those close to him, but
not to the traffic agent who he struck).
107 NICHOLAS TAVUCHIS, MEA CULPA: A SOCIOLOGY OF APOLOGY AND
RECONCILIATION 13 (1991).
108 Hampton, supra note 76, at 1698-99.
109 Recently, a number of commentators have argued that apologies may
prevent litigation and promote settlement. See Cohen, supra note 106; Deborah L. Levi,
The Role of Apology in Mediation, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165 (1997); Aviva Orenstein,
Apology Excepted: Incorporating a Feminist Analysis into Evidence Policy Where You
Would Least Expect It, 28 Sw. U. L. REV. 221 (1999). See also Lee Taft, Apology
Subverted: The Commodification of Apology, 109 YALE L.J. 1135 (2000). For empirical
studies of the effects of apologies on settlement see Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie,
Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH.
L. REV. 107 (1994); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Settlement, Apologies, and the Rules of
Evidence (May 2002) (unpublished paper presented at the Law and Society Association
Annual Meeting, Vancouver, B.C.).
1o See Mark Bennett & Deborah Earwaker, Victim's Response to Apologies:
The Effects of Offender Responsibility and Offense Severity, 134 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 457
(1994); Donald E. Conlon & Noel M. Murray, Customer Perceptions of Corporate
Responses to Product Complaints: The Role of Explanations, 39 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1040
(1996); Bruce W. Darby & Barry R. Schlenker, Children's Reactions to Apologies, 43 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 742 (1982); Bruce W. Darby & Barry R. Schlenker,
Childrens' Reactions to Transgressions: Effects of the Actor's Apology, Reputation, and
Remorse, 28 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 353 (1989); Gregg J. Gold & Bernard Weiner,
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criminal defendants have generally shown that remorseful
defendants are perceived more positively and sentenced more
leniently than are defendants who do not show remorse."'
Similarly, the only experimental study of remorse in a civil
case found that defendants in civil trials who show remorse
were perceived more positively than those who did not."
Remorse did not, however, appear to substitute for
compensatory damages."'
Remorse, Confession, Group Identity, and Expectancies About Repeating a
Transgression, 22 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 291 (2000); Marti Hope Gonzales et
al., Victims as "Narrative Critics:" Factors Influencing Rejoinders and Evaluative
Responses to Offenders' Accounts, 20 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 691 (1994);
Ken-ichi Ohbuchi et al., Apology as Aggression Control: Its Role in Mediating Appraisal
of and Response to Harm, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 219 (1989); Ken-ichi
Ohbuchi & Kobun Sato, Children's Reactions to Mitigating Accounts, 134 J. SOC.
PSYCHOL. 5 (1994); Steven J. Scher & John M. Darley, How Effective are the Things
People Say to Apologize? Effects of the Realization of the Apology Speech Act, 26 J.
PSYCHOLINGUISTIC RES. 127 (1997); Gary S. Schwartz et al,, The Effects of Post-
Transgression Remorse on Perceived Aggression, Attributions of Intent, and Level of
Punishment, 17 BRIT. J. SOC. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 293 (1978); Bernard Weiner et al.,
Public Confession and Forgiveness, 59 J. PERSONALITY 281 (1991).
... See Michael G. Rumsey, Effects of Defendant Background and Remorse on
Sentencing Judgments, 6 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 64 (1976) (finding that participants
gave a defendant in a drunk driving case who was described as "extremely remorseful"
a shorter sentence than they did a defendant who gave "no indication of remorse");
Christy Taylor & Chris L. Kleinke, Effects of Severity of Accident, History of Drunk
Driving, Intent, and Remorse on Judgments of a Drunk Driver, 22 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1641 (1992) (finding that a defendant who expressed remorse was rated as
being a person of greater responsibility and sensitivity than a defendant who did not
express remorse, but not finding significant differences in sentences); Chris L. Kleinke
et al., Evaluation of a Rapist as a Function of Expressed Intent and Remorse, 132 J.
SOC. PSYCHOL. 525 (1992) (finding that a convicted rapist was judged to have acted less
intentionally, to be of less negative character and to have more potential for
rehabilitation if he demonstrated remorse than if he did not. Moreover, recommended
sentences were predicted by perceived remorse); Randolph B. Pipes & Marci Alessi,
Remorse and a Previously Punished Offense in Assignment of Punishment and
Estimated Likelihood of a Repeated Offense, 85 PSYCHOL. REP. 246 (1999). For some
boundary conditions on these types of effects see Keith E. Neidermeier et al.,
Exceptions to the Rule: The Effects of Remorse, Status, and Gender on Decision Making,
31 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 604 (2001). Interviews with jurors in capital cases also
provide evidence that the degree to which jurors perceived defendants to be remorseful
influenced their choice between a sentence of life in prison and death. See Theodore
Eisenberg et al., But Was He Sorry? The Role of Remorse in Capital Sentencing, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 1599 (1998).
112 Brian Bornstein et al., The Effects of Defendant Remorse on Mock Juror
Decisions in a Malpractice Case, 20 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 393 (2002). In his first study,
Bornstein found that remorse had a significant positive effect on jurors' overall
perceptions of the defendant. Id. at 400. In a second study, Bornstein found that
defendants who expressed remorse were perceived as having suffered more than
defendants who did not express remorse. Id. at 404.
113 Id. at 404. In the first study, male participants awarded marginally less in
damages against the defendant, a physician, who expressed remorse at the time of trial
or who did nothing to indicate remorse or lack thereof, than they did against
defendants who were remorseless or who expressed remorse early (at the time of the
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Thus, while offering an apology may not be the best
mechanism by which to achieve compensation, it may be a
better mechanism by which to express the proper relative
moral positions of the parties than is a monetary award. To the
extent that a voluntarily offered apology has restored equity
between the parties in whole or in part, decision makers may
view and use the sanctioning options available to them
differently. Similarly, if civil decision makers were allowed to
compel an apology as part of their verdict, they might choose to
do so as a better way by which to restore equity."'
To the extent that the transgressor's wrongful conduct
has conveyed the message that the offender considers the
victim to be beneath her, an apology, voluntary or compelled,
serves as a degradation ceremony that restores equal footing
between victim and offender. If the apology involves a public
expression of remorse, it may address the loss of face that the
victim has suffered in front of the witnessing community.
Moreover, the victim may see an apology that is enforced by a
judgmental body, even if insincere, as a community statement
that the victim is not to be treated as less valuable than others.
The apology, then, sends a signal to the offender, the victim
and the community that the victim is a valued and defended
member of the community who cannot be treated in a fashion
that diminishes her worth.
incident). For female participants, remorse had no effect on damage awards. Id. at 399-
400. In a second study, participants awarded more in compensatory damages against
the defendant, who displayed remorse at the time of the event and then again at the
time of trial, than they did in the other three conditions. Id. at 403. Given potential
spillover between liability and damages decisions, it is unclear how these results might
have been affected by telling jurors to assume that the defendant was liable. It is
possible that jurors used the available decision to achieve goals that might otherwise
have been achieved through the rendering of a liability verdict.
114 See, e.g., Richard Monastersky, Former History Professor Wins $5.3-Million
Verdict Against Fairleigh Dickinson U., CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 21, 2001
(describing a jury that asked the defendant to "offer a formal written apology" to the
plaintiff). Civil jurors, however, do not typically have the ability to compel an apology
from the defendant to the plaintiff. The First Amendment raises potential obstacles to
compelled apologies in civil cases. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977)
("[Tihe right of freedom of thought protected against state action includes both the
right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all."). See also Griffith v.
Smith, 30 Va. Cir. 250 (1993) ("First Amendment concerns preclude the Court from
ordering the apology originally suggested."); Imperial Diner, Inc. v. State Human
Rights Appeal Bd., 417 N.E.2d 525 (N.Y. 1980).
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III. LEGAL DECISION MAKING AS CONSTRAINT SATISFACTION
The above theories and studies suggest that legal
decision makers make decisions that may reflect a variety of
expressive goals in addition to other goals, including those
contained in legal theory, that they hope to achieve. Accounts
of legal decision making that ignore these expressive motives
are likely to be inadequate. In addition, any account of legal
decision making that portrays decision makers as having
singular goals is likely to be insufficient. Thus, for example,
accounts of legal decision making premised on decision makers
being solely concerned with effecting optimal deterrence are
unlikely to capture important aspects of the decision-making
task.11 Similarly, an account based solely on a picture of
decision makers pursuing only expressive goals will miss
important parts of the picture. Accordingly, accounts of legal
decision making should comprise the variety of considerations
that decision makers might bring to bear on their verdicts.
To this end, legal decision making might profitably be
conceived of as a process of parallel constraint satisfaction that
can be represented using connectionist models."6 These models
attempt to simulate situations in which the decision maker
must integrate numerous "mutually interacting" elements (e.g.,
... See Sunstein et al., supra note 16; Baron & Ritov, supra note 100; and
Viscusi, supra note 7 for evidence that jurors do not always effect optimal deterrence.
See also Galanter & Luban, supra note 4, at 1450 ("[Clitizens and legislators may
rightly insist that they are willing to tolerate some loss in economic efficiency in order
to deter what they consider morally offensive conduct, albeit cost-beneficial morally
offensive conduct: efficiency is just one consideration among many.").
116 See generally CONNECTIONIST MODELS OF SOCIAL REASONING AND SOCIAL
BEHAVIOR (Stephen J. Read & Lynn C. Miller eds., 1998). See also Stephen J. Read et
al., Connectionism, Parallel Constraint Satisfaction Processes, and Gestalt Principles:
(Re)Introducing Cognitive Dynamics to Social Psychology, 1 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. REV. 26 (1997) ("Connectionism, neural networks, and parallel distributed
processing models are among the fastest growing research areas in the study of the
mind."). There are other theoretical traditions in psychology that might also be invoked
to characterize goal multiplicity and goal conflict, including the psychodynamic (or
Freudian) approach, the cognitive consistency approach (including cognitive dissonance
theory) and the control theory or cybernetic approach. Interestingly, the constraint
satisfaction approach appears to capture important insights from all three traditions.
See Paul Thagard & Josef Nerb, Emotional Gestalts: Appraisal Change and the
Dynamics of Affect, 6 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 274 (2002); Dan Simon &
Keith J. Holyoak, Structural Dynamics of Cognition: From Consistency Theories to
Constraint Satisfaction, 6 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 283 (2002); Charles S.
Carver & Michael F. Scheier, Control Processes and Self- Organization as
Complementary Principles Underlying Behavior, 6 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV.
304 (2002).
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pieces of evidence, concepts, propositions or goals), that may or
may not be consistent, into a coherent whole.'17
A. Parallel Constraint Satisfaction
When decision making is thought of as a constraint
satisfaction network, the factors related to the decision are
conceived of as nodes or elements in a neural-like network.
Depending on the decision-making task, these elements can be
pieces of evidence, propositions, concepts, goals and so on.
118
Elements are connected by links that are weighted (indicating
the strength of the link) and valenced (indicating the coherence
or incoherence between the elements). The valence of the link
represents the extent to which the elements constrain or
reinforce each other. Elements may be coherent; that is, they
are mutually supportive of each other. In contrast, elements
may be incoherent, or negatively associated." 9 Thus, if one
element explains or facilitates another element, the link
between them will be positively valenced. Conversely, elements
that are incompatible or that inhibit each other will be
connected by negatively valenced links.2 ° For example, one
person might be observed hitting another in the shoulder. The
blow might either be interpreted as a violent strike or as a
friendly cuff. An element representing the blow itself would be
positively linked to elements representing each of these
interpretations; the elements representing these two
inconsistent interpretations, however, would be connected by a
negative link.
Decision making, then, is the process by which the "best
compromise among the constraints" 2' is selected by "dividing a
set of elements into accepted and rejected sets in a way that
satisfies the most constraints."22 This division is achieved
based on each element's level of activation (e.g., ranging from
-1 to 1). In a parallel constraint satisfaction connectionist
117 CONNECTIONIST MODELS OF SOCIAL REASONING AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR,
supra note 116, at vii.
,, Read et al., supra note 116, at 29 ("What the nodes and links represent
depends on the theoretical assumptions of a specific model.").
1'9 Id. at 28; PAUL THAGARD, COHERENCE IN THOUGHT AND ACTION 17 (2000).
'20 Read et al., supra note 116, at 28; THAGARD, supra note 119, at 17.
121 Stephen J. Read & Amy Marcus-Newhall, Explanatory Coherence in Social
Explanations: A Parallel Distributed Processing Account, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 429, 431 (1993).
122 THAGARD, supra note 119, at 17.
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model, each element is assigned an equal initial activation
value (e.g., .01).123 The central aspect of the model is that the
activation level of each element in the model is then updated
simultaneously based on four factors: (1) the number of other
elements connected to it; (2) the level of activation of those
elements; (3) the strength of the links to these other elements;
and (4) the valence of those links. 24 This updating process is
iterated with activation of elements spreading through the
network based on the configuration of links between the
elements until the activation of each element stabilizes.'25 Once
the network settles, each element is accepted or rejected based
on its final degree of activation.126
In this way, a parallel constraint satisfaction model
"simultaneously solves for a set of constraints among a set of
concepts.""7 As Stephen Read, Eric Vanman and Lynn Miller
describe it:
When activation spreads through such a network, nodes with
positive links will tend to activate each other and nodes with
negative links will inhibit each other. Because the activation of a
node is a result of all of its positive and negative links to other nodes,
the final activation of the node can be thought of as a solution to all
the constraints represented by the links. Moreover, because
activation is spread in parallel among all the connected nodes, this
process results in a global solution to the constraints among the
entire set of nodes.
28
This basic model, in which multiple, complexly related
elements are simultaneously integrated in parallel to achieve a
coherent decision, "is general enough to be applicable to any
judgment task that requires the integration of many sources of
123 Id. at 30-31. Within the model, it is possible to link favored elements (such
as empirical data) to an element that is set at a maximum activation. This gives
priority to those elements, at least initially, as the model updates. Id.
124 Read et al., supra note 116, at 29.
125 Id. at 27-28; THAGARD, supra note 119, at 30-31. Read et al., supra note
116, at 37 ("[O]ne way to view what is happening is that this is an attempt to minimize
the degree of tension or conflict .... given the constraints imposed by the actual set of
relations among the cognitive elements.").
126 THAGARD, supra note 119, at 30-31 (describing how elements are accepted
if activation is above specified threshold).
127 Read et al., supra note 116, at 27.121 Id. at 29. See also Read & Marcus-Newhall, supra note 121, at 431 ("The
greater the number of excitatory links to a concept and the greater the strength of the
links, the higher the activation of that concept. Conversely, the greater the number of
inhibitory links and the greater their strength, the lower the activation of that concept.
By this process, concepts that are not supported by other concepts die out, and concepts
that are supported are strengthened.").
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information."'29 Thus, it is a useful model with which to
understand legal decision making.13' First, legal decision
makers engage in constraint satisfaction with regard to the
story they select to account for the evidence presented at trial
(explanatory coherence). Second, decision makers attempt to
select verdicts that maximize satisfaction of their goals
(deliberative coherence).' We explore these possible
applications of the basic parallel constraint satisfaction model
below.
B. Explanatory Coherence
A parallel constraint satisfaction model of explanatory
coherence is particularly useful for understanding how legal
decision makers select a story that represents what happened
in a case, integrating the numerous pieces of potentially
129 Ziva Kunda & Paul Thagard, Forming Impressions From Stereotypes,
Traits, and Behaviors: A Parallel-Constraint-Satisfaction Theory, 103 PSYCHOL. REV.
284, 304 (1996). See, e.g., Keith J. Holyoak & Paul Thagard, Analogical Mapping by
Constraint Satisfaction, 13 COGNITIVE SCI. 295 (1989) (analogical mapping); W.
Kintsch, The Role of Knowledge in Discourse Comprehension: A Construction-
Integration Model, 95 PSYCHOL. REV. 163 (1988) (discourse comprehension); D. Marr &
T. Poggio, Cooperative Comutation of Stereo Disparity, 194 SCIENCE 283 (1976)
(stereoscopic vision); James L. McClelland & David E. Rumelhart, An Interactive
Activation Model of Context Effects in Letter Perception: Part I. An Account of Basic
Findings, 88 PSYCHOL. REV. 375 (1981) (letter perception); Walter Mischel & Yaichi
Shoda, A Cognitive-Affective System Theory of Personality: Reconceptualizing
Situations, Dispositions, Dynamics, and the Invariance in Personality Structure, 102
PSYCHOL. REV. 246 (1995) (understanding personality traits); T.R. Schultz & M.R.
Lepper, A Constraint Satisfaction Model of Cognitive Dissonance Phenomena, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTEENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE
SOCIETY 462 (1992) (dissonance reduction).
130 In 1992, Thagard noted the close parallels between his constraint
satisfaction model of explanatory coherence and the influential "story model" of juror
cognition. See PAUL THAGARD, CONCEPTUAL REVOLUTIONS (1992); Nancy Pennington &
Reid Hastie, Explaining the Evidence: Tests of the Story Model for Juror Decision
Making, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 189 (1992). See also infra notes 136-39
and accompanying text. Another recent application of constraint satisfaction to legal
decision making is the research program of Simon and Holyoak. See Keith J. Holyoak
& Dan Simon, Bidirectional Reasoning in Decision Making by Constraint Satisfaction,
128 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GENERAL 3 (1999); Simon & Holyoak, supra note 116.
131 While our remarks here focus on the decisions of individual decision
makers, the concepts involved in parallel constraint satisfaction networks can be
extended to model decisions by groups such as juries. For example, Thagard describes a
model of consensus decision making in which
[clonsensus arises when individuals in a group exchange information to a
sufficient extent that they come to make the same coherence judgments about
what to accept and what to reject. The information exchange involves both
elements to be favored in a coherence evaluation ... and descriptions of the
explanatory and other relations that hold between elements.
THAGARD, supra note 119, at 225-26.
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contradictory evidence presented at trial.132 In a model of
explanatory coherence, decision makers "construct an
interpretation that fits with the available information better
than alternative interpretations."'83 As Paul Thagard explains,
"the best interpretation is one that provides the most coherent
account of what we want to understand, considering both
pieces of information that fit with each other and pieces of
information that do not fit with each other."
34
In a connectionist model of the theory of explanatory
coherence applied to legal decision making, the elements in the
model are the evidence presented and propositions,
explanations or hypotheses about this evidence. The links
between the elements are based on "relations of explanation
and analogy that hold between propositions."3 ' For example, a
hypothesis would have a positive link to a piece of evidence
that it explains and a negative link to a contradictory
hypothesis; contradictory pieces of evidence would be connected
by a negative link. In a connectionist model, the activation of
the elements is updated in parallel until the network
iteratively converges on a configuration of activated elements
that represents maximal satisfaction of the constraints
imposed. Decision makers then choose the account or story that
has the best coherence as indicated by the final pattern of
activation among the elements.
This process of parallel constraint satisfaction is
consistent with psychological understanding of juror decision
making. In making sense of contradictory facts and testimony
presented at trial and different explanations for the evidence
presented by the opposing sides, jurors are often called upon to
accept an account that best fits with the available evidence. 36
Pennington and Hastie's story model of juror decision making
proposes that jurors: (1) construct and evaluate narrative
stories of the events at issue based on the information
132 Paul Thagard & Ziva Kunda, Making Sense of People: Coherence
Mechansims, in CONNECTIONIST MODELS OF SOCIAL REASONING AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR,
supra note 116, at 3 ("Processes of maximizing explanatory coherence are particularly
well-suited for accounting for jury decision making, where the task is to evaluate the
coherence of accounts presented by the prosecution and the defense.").
133 THAGARD, supra note 119, at 16.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 21.
136 Read & Marcus-Newhall, supra note 121, at 429 ("We suggest that part of
what people do in trying to explain such a sequence of behaviors is to try to find the
exp]anation that best fits or is the most coherent with the events to be explained.").
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presented at trial; (2) learn the verdict alternatives; and (3)
match the story that they have accepted to the appropriate
verdict. 37 The coherence of each proposed account or story is
integral to its acceptability: While multiple stories may be
considered, a more coherent story is more likely to be
accepted.'38 Connectionist models provide a formal structure for
the mechanism by which the coherence of different stories is
evaluated. Recently, these types of parallel constraint
satisfaction models have been applied to explain decisions in
both mock jury experiments and in actual jury trials. 139
C. Deliberative Coherence
Another way in which parallel constraint satisfaction
models could be applied to legal decision making is more
central to our point here. In a model of deliberative coherence,
decision makers both evaluate potentially inconsistent goals
and select actions to perform, "with the desirability of actions
and goals determined by a judgment of . . . deliberative
coherence," that is, the degree to which the system of
interconnected actions and goals cohere. "' As Thagard
explains:
In brief, decision making is inference to the best plan. When people
make decisions, they do not simply choose an action to perform, but
rather adopt complex plans on the basis of a holistic assessment of
various competing actions and goals. Choosing a plan is in part a
matter of evaluating goals as well as actions. Choice is made by
137 Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Evidence Evaluation in Complex
Decision Making, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 242 (1986); Nancy Pennington &
Reid Hastie, Explanation-Based Decision Making: Effects of Memory Structure on
Judgment, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY, & COGNITION 521
(1988); Pennington & Hastie, supra note 130. See, e.g., Pennington & Hastie, supra
note 17, at 198 fig. 8.1.
138 Pennington & Hastie, supra note 130, at 198.
139 See Holyoak & Simon, supra note 130; Dan Simon, A Psychological Model
of Judicial Decision Making, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 1 (1998); Paul Thagard, Explanatory
Coherence, 12 BEHAV. & BRAIN SC. 435 (1989) (using ECHO computer program to
model reasoning in two actual murder trials); Michael D. Byrne, The Convergence of
Explanatory Coherence and the Story Model: A Case Study in Juror Decisions, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 17TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE SOCIETY
(Johanna D. Moore & Jill Fain Lehman eds., 1995) (using ECHO to model decisions of
subjects from Pennington & Hastie's 1993 study, cited supra note 17). See also Stephen
J. Read & Lynn C. Miller, Rapist or "Regular Guy": Explanatory Coherence in the
Construction of Mental Models of Others, 19 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 526
(1993).
140 Paul Thagard & Elijah Millgram, Inference to the Best Plan: A Coherence
Theory of Decision, in GOAL-DRIVEN LEARNING 439, 439-40 (Ashwin Ram & David B.
Leake eds., 1995).
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arriving at a plan or plans that involve actions and goals that are
coherent with other actions and goals to which one is committed.1
4 1
Parallel constraint satisfaction modeling of deliberative
coherence provides a formal model for how decision makers
"mediate among the influence of multiple, salient, and often
conflicting goals and do so in a way that results in reasonable
behavior that is sensitive both to the desires of the individual
and the opportunities and constraints of the environment."
1 42
In the context of civil cases, we suggest that decision
makers attempt to reach a decision that balances multiple,
potentially inconsistent goals and fits within the constraints of
the legal decision-making task (e.g., jury instructions, verdict
options, etc.). Just as parallel constraint satisfaction models of
explanatory coherence frame the way in which legal decision
makers map the trial evidence onto a coherent story and match
that story to the verdict options, we propose that parallel
constraint satisfaction models of deliberative coherence can
frame the way in which legal decision makers map their
myriad goals onto the available verdict options.
The elements in such a connectionist model of
deliberative coherence are actions and goals. The links between
these elements are based on whether they facilitate or inhibit
each other, or are compatible or incompatible, and the degree
to which this is so. 14' For example, the goal of engaging in moral
cleansing may be connected by a positive link to the action of
awarding a particular dollar amount, while the goal of
appropriately compensating the plaintiff may be connected by a
negative link to that same dollar award.
It is useful to think of these links as implementing the
goal management principles described earlier. For example, a
goal might be connected by positive links to more than one
action (equifinality) and each possible action may be connected
by positive links to more than one goal (multifinality). At the
same time, the links between a goal and several different
141 Id. at 440 (describing deliberative coherence as "an account of the nature of
human decision making that we think is more psychologically realistic than classical
decision theory").
142 Read et al., supra note 116, at 47 (describing deliberative coherence
generally). For a thorough discussion of deliberative coherence see Thagard &
Millgram, supra note 140. See also Suzanne M. Mannes & Walter Kintsch, Routine
Computing Tasks: Planning as Understanding, 15 COGNITIVE ScI. 305 (1991)
(describing model of goal-directed behavior based on parallel constraint satisfaction).
143 Thagard & Millgram, supra note 140.
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actions may have different weights (best fit) and some of the
links between two goals or two actions may be negatively
valenced (incompatibility). The connectionist network updates
activation of the elements (goals and actions) in parallel until
the network stabilizes. In this case, the final activation of the
elements represents the decision maker's chosen set of selected
actions and goal valuations.'
While distinct from explanatory coherence, deliberative
coherence is connected to explanatory coherence. Any of the
many "[1acilitative and competitive relations [among actions
and goals] may often depend on the coherence of the goals and
actions with factual beliefs, which indicate the degree of
facilitation or inhibition that is believed to be the case."145 Thus,
the deliberative coherence of an action taken (e.g., a particular
dollar award) to further a given goal (e.g., deterrence) depends
in part on the explanatory coherence of the judgment that that
action will facilitate the desired goal (e.g., beliefs about the
degree to which the dollar award will in fact deter the
defendant).
A simplified example illustrates these relationships.
Imagine a decision maker has determined that a defendant is
liable for a plaintiffs injuries and is attempting to determine
whether a monetary award in the amount requested by the
plaintiff or in the amount recommended by the defendant
would be more appropriate. Imagine further that the decision
maker has only the following goals: to express disapproval of
the behavior, to cover the plaintiffs out-of-pocket expenses, and
to not overcompensate the plaintiff. Figure 1 below represents
these verdict options and decision maker goals in one possible
connectionist framework. Solid lines represent compatible
relationships and broken lines represent incompatible
relationships. The decision maker might believe that either
award would cover the plaintiffs expenses (equifinality), but
that the larger amount would overcompensate the plaintiff
(incompatibility). At the same time, the decision maker may
144 Id. at 444. See also Read et al., supra note 116, at 49 ("[Tlhe decision
maker is predicted to choose the set of actions and goals that are most coherent and
have the highest levels of activation. Actions and goals with high levels of activation
are part of the plan to be performed."). In order to account for the "intrinsic desirability
of some goals," goals may be linked to units that begin with different levels of
activation to indicate "different degrees of desirability." Thagard & Millgram, supra
note 140, at 444.
145 Read et al., supra note 116, at 49; Thagard & Millgram, supra note 140, at
442; THAGARD, supra note 119, at 129-30.
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believe that either amount would serve to express disapproval
(equifinality), but believe that the larger amount may better
convey this disapproval (best fit). Thus, the smaller award
would serve to cover the plaintiffs expenses while not
overcompensating the plaintiff, and would express to some
degree the decision maker's disapproval of the defendant's
behavior (multifinality). Yet, the larger award would serve to
cover the plaintiffs expenses and would strongly express
disapproval (multifinality), but would overcompensate the
plaintiff (incompatibility). The decision maker would choose the
award that best satisfies the various goals based on the
strength of each goal, the relationships between the goals and
the verdict options and the decision maker's beliefs about
effectiveness of each verdict option for satisfying each goal
(explanatory coherence).4 '
This conceptualization of legal decision making suggests
that decision makers faced with different arrays of verdict
options or possessing different combinations of goals may reach
different judgments based on identical bodies of evidence, and
it suggests the mechanism by which this could occur.
Consistent with this notion, empirical research on punitive
damages decision making suggests that changing the available
verdict options can affect how decision makers utilize the
remaining options to effectuate their goals.147 Anderson and
MacCoun found that jurors who were not allowed to award
punitive damages in response to a personal injury scenario
awarded more in pain and suffering than did those who were
allowed to make an award of punitive damages.4 ' Similarly, in
their recent investigation of limits on punitive damages, Edith
Greene, David Coon and Brian Bornstein found that jurors who
were not given the opportunity to award punitive damages
awarded more in compensatory damages than did jurors who
146 This model is highly simplified; a more sophisticated model would
incorporate additional possible verdict options, additional goals and other influences on
decision making. Importantly, it is likely that decision makers' judgments about
damages are made along a more continuous scale than is suggested by this simplified
model. See Kahneman et al., supra note 48; Sunstein et al., supra note 48. A more
elaborate modeling effort would be necessary to address these scaling issues. But cf.
Bibb Latane, Strength from Weakness: The Fate of Opinion Minorities in Spatially
Distributed Groups, in UNDERSTANDING GROUP BEHAVIOR 193 (Erich H. Witte &
James H. Davis eds., 1996).
147 Correspondingly, changes in the goals the decision maker seeks to fulfill
ought to change how the decision maker uses the verdict options to fulfill those goals.
118 Anderson & MacCoun, supra note 15, at 319-20.
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were allowed to make unrestrained punitive damage awards.'
Moreover, they found no differences in the total damages
awarded by the two groups. 5 ' The results of these studies
suggest that decision makers who are blocked from expressing
their punitive intent through punitive damages find other
mechanisms through which to satisfy their goals (i.e.,
equifinality).,' Similarly, if the defendant had already fulfilled,
in whole or in part, one or more of the decision maker's goals,
for example, by offering an apology, the decision maker might
be expected to make use of the verdict options differently than
if no apology were forthcoming or could be compelled.'
Thus, just as different accounts of the events in a case
compete for acceptance by the finder-of-fact, so too legal
decision makers attempt to address multiple goals that
compete to be satisfied. Verdict options, including a liability
verdict and compensatory and punitive damages, may be used
by legal decision makers in their attempts simultaneously to
fulfill compensatory, expressive, punishment, deterrence,
distributive justice and moral cleansing goals along with other
normative and non-normative goals. Conceiving of civil verdicts
as the outcome of attempts to use the available verdict options
to satisfy these multiple, potentially competing goals in parallel
provides a useful model for more thoroughly understanding
such decisions.
CONCLUSION
A multi-motive conception of jurors, in contrast to
traditional accounts of decision makers as focused on singular
goals, provides a richer picture of the cognitive processing of
legal decision making in civil cases. Considering goals that
have not been traditionally considered by the law, such as
differing notions of distributive justice, expressive and value
concerns, reactions to taboo trade-offs and concerns for moral
balance between the parties, explains a variety of empirically
observed phenomena that are difficult to account for with
149 Greene et al., supra note 19, at 226.
160 Id. at 228 (i.e., the compensatory damages awarded by the group not
allowed to award punitive damages were no different from the total of the
compensatory and punitive damages in the group allowed to award both).
15' Galanter & Luban, supra note 4, at 1406 ("[Tlhe legal line between
punitive damages and compensatory damages does not accurately demarcate the
presence of motives or perceptions of punishment.").
152 See supra Part II.C.3.
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typical single motive accounts (e.g., the optimal deterrence
model). Moreover, insight into how decision makers manage
these diverse goals is gained by conceptualizing these multiple
goals as interrelated in complex ways according to a set of goal
management principles and dealt with through a system of
cognitive processing that attempts to satisfy as many of these
goals to the greatest extent possible through a process of
parallel constraint satisfaction.
Figure 1: Deliberative Coherence of Decision Goals and Verdict Options
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